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INTRODUCTION TO U.S.-JAPANESE INVESTMENT
DAN FENNO HENDERSON*
The legal environment for foreign investment in Japan has under-
gone sweeping changes in the past year, both in the Japanese domestic
legislation and in the international law spheres. New international law
commitments started with findings of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) about a year and a half ago that Japanese economic
conditions warranted a relaxation of foreign exchange controls, and
after the necessary adjustments, on March 12, 1964, Japan arranged
to shift her IMF status from an Article XIV country to an Article
VIII country,' meaning essentially that thereafter her foreign exchange
budget was abolished and her current accounts (i.e., import-export
payments, interest, royalties, dividends, etc.) became freely convertible
into foreign exchange. But quota allocations were instituted to serve
as new import control mechanisms for all non-liberalized import items
(8-10%) in place of the prior foreign exchange controls. In parallel
negotiations Japan arranged to become a member of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) effective April
27, 1964. Japan thus became the twenty-fifth Article VIII nation out
of 105 IMF members, and the twenty-first member of OECD.
Symbolizing her graduation into the ranks of the developed nations,
Japan's OECD membership entails commitments to liberalize her
capital transactions in due course, although, for the time being, OECD
has granted' reservations to Japan which allow her to continue tight
controls on capital transactions. These reservations were deemed
necessary because, though the Japanese economy is approaching a de-
* Professor of Law and Director, Asian Law Program, University of Washington.
IIMF Agreement, Art. VIII, §§ 1-4 cover these obligations.
2 OECD, MEmoRANDuM OF UNDERSTANDING BErwEEN THE ORGANIZATION FOR Eco-
NOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN CONCERNING
THE ASSUMPION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN OF THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP
OF THE ORGANIZATION; for the Convention and subsidiary regulations, see OECD, THaE
ORGANIZATION FOR EcONOMIc COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 43 (no date, circa. 1963).
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veloped status, it still faces a difficult transition and adjustment. For
example, in 1962 the Japanese per capita gross national product was
still only $554 compared with the United States, $2939; United King-
dom, $1478; Belgium, $1579; and France, $1545.'
These new international commitments have required basic changes
in the Japanese legislative and administrative controls related to foreign
trade and investment. Basically, since 1950 the whole of Japanese
foreign trade and investment (defined to include technological assis-
tance) had been rigidly controlled by a foreign exchange budget and
an official License (kyoka) or Validation (ninka) apparatus set up in
1949 and 1950 under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control
Law' (FECL) and Law Concerning Foreign Investment (FIL),'
respectively, and administered primarily by the Ministry of Finance
(MOF) and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) ,' with a dual purpose of manipulating Japan's scarce postwar
foreign exchange holdings so as to (1) insure balance of payments
abroad and (2) rehabilitate her trade and war devastated industry in
an orderly manner This system required a validation (FIL) or
license (FECL) for all foreign investments which sought guaranties
of foreign exchange repatriation of principle or income. As a rule,
"orderly development of Japanese industry" has also meant in postwar
Japanese administrative circles the exclusion of foreigners in the man-
agement of validated Japanese enterprises, except in cases where
necessary foreign technology could not be obtained by patent and
know-how licensing alone, in which case selected minority equities
were occasionally validated, especially before the occupation ended
(1952) and since 1960. Alternatively, before July 1, 1963, non-
validated foreign management participation was possible, however, by
use of the so-called yen base company, whereby foreigners were
allowed to go into business for a yen return only. They simply estab-
lished a Japanese subsidiary or branch without obtaining a validation
and consequently, without obtaining the right to repatriate capital or
earnings in foreign currency. At first the yen base vehicle was little
used by foreigners because the Japanese economy did not offer an at-
3OECD, ECONOMIC SURVEY BY THE OECD: JAPAN 9 (1964).
4 Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (Gaikoku kawase oyobi gai-
koku baeki kanrihO) (Law No. 228, 1949) in 2 EHS No. 5010 [hereinafter cited FECL].
5 Law Concerning Foreign Investment (Gaishi ni kansuru hritsu) (Law No. 163,
1950) in 5 EHS No. 5410 [hereinafter cited FIL].
6 For procedures see J5iKAGAKU KOGYO TS5SHINSHA, GAIKOKU GIJUTSU DoNYU
Y6RAN (Guide to induction of foreign technology) 21-44 (1964).
7 FECL art. 1 (1949) ; FIL art. 1 (1950).
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tractive investment potential without foreign exchange guaranties, but
after 1959, as the economy strengthened more and more firms availed
themselves of the yen base company, looking to a future date when the
economy would be generally liberalized. Although the official policy
favoring loans, licensing, and portfolio investments and against direct
foreign investment, especially majority owned ones, was never clearly
articulated in the regulations, such a policy has been strictly pursued,
and thus there developed a conflict between the strong underlying Japa-
nese policy to control Japanese industrial development and exclude
foreign management and, on the other hand, the foreigners' growing
interest in the yen base mode of non-validated Japanese enterprise.
The foregoing background will assist newcomers in the Japanese
investment field to understand why it has happened that in the course
of the liberalizations in the past year attendant upon the new OECD
and IMF commitments, the Japanese controls over direct foreign
investment have become much more comprehensive than ever before,
although perhaps not stricter.
Starting with the IMF Article VIII requirement that current ac-
counts, including foreign shareholders' dividends, be made remittable
in foreign exchange, the Japanese Government deemed it necessary to
abolish the yen base company as a future vehicle for foreign investors
in order to prevent foreign management control of important industries
and to prevent the Article VIII repatriation of earnings from uncon-
trolled direct yen base investments from possibly becoming a balance
of payment problem. So on July 1, 1963, by administrative order8
and newspaper announcements, new yen base investments were pro-
hibited, and thereafter all acquisitions of any Japanese corporate shares
involving management participation have required validations. This
was a fundamental policy shift from requiring validation for payments
to foreign investors to requiring validation for the basic transaction
itself.
Finally, amendments' effective April 1, 1964, to the FIL and FECL
abolished the foreign exchange budget and controls on conversion of
8 Cabinet Order No. 228, June 29, 1963, effective July 1, 1963, which amended the
Cabinet Order Concerning Exceptions, etc., to Standards of Validation Based on the
Law Concerning Foreign Investment (Gaishi ni kansuru huritsu no kitei ni motozuku
ninka no kijun no tokurei-tj ni kanuru seirei (Cabinet Order No. 221, July 1, 1952)
in 5 EHS No. 5470. Thus, the FIL was left in its original form until April 1, 1964,
and it seems that between July 1, 1963, and April 1, 1964 (when the FIL was
amended), there was no legal basis for preventing yen base investments, since the
unamended FIL art. 10 only prohibited acquisitions requiring foreign exchange
payments.
9 Law No. 33, Mar. 31, 1964.
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current accounts, thus completing the changes in the legal structure
so as to require approvals for all transfers of capital and technology
between foreign parents and Japanese subsidiaries or branches."
Whereas before the official sanction was required only for the payment,
now the license is required for the underlying obligation and validation
is required for all transfers, whether gratuitous or not, between parents
and subsidiaries or branches. It is said that validations are more freely
and more quickly granted than in the past. But it is certainly more
difficult now for a foreigner to get a validation and establish a majority
owned business in Japan than it was when the yen base was available
as a free, if underprivileged, alternative to the validation system.
Foreign portfolio (indirect) investments in Japanese securities within
percentage limits on holdings in any given corporation were finally
freed for immediate repatriation of income and capital in April, 1963.11
But such securities have felt the impact of recent legislation-in this
case the U.S. Interest Equalization Tax of 1964." Ever since President
Kennedy announced in July 17, 1963, that such a tax bill, covering
certain acquisitions of foreign securities from July 18, 1963, would be
introduced in the U.S. Congress, the effect has been almost as if it
were already law. For immediately the demand for Japanese securities
which was being developed in the cheap New York capital market 3
dried up, and foreign share issues of Japanese firms have since mi-
grated to the European capital centers.
Despite these recent developments, it seems very likely that Japan
will continue to be a capital importing nation for some time to come."
In their various categories, the total foreign investments (including
technological assistance agreements) which have been validated from
the effective date of the FIL and FECL (1950) to March 1, 1964
(roughly to the end of the various changes chronicled above), are as
follows:"5
10 Also, note the issuance of Ministerial Ordinance Concerning Report of Non-
Residents' Branches, Factories, and Other Places of Business in Japan (Joint MOF
& MITI Notification No. 1, July 1, 1963), based on FECL art. 27(3), which requires
a report upon the establishment of a corporate branch, etc., in Japan. This report
system is aimed at obtaining the information necessary for determining whether to
grant official approval for transfers to branches.
11 GAIKOKU KAWASE BOEKI KENKYUKAI, B6EKI-GAI SHIHARAI BENRAN (Manual
for payments other than trade) 7 (1964) ; TRADE BULLETIN CORP. (Tokyo), COMmEN-
TARIES ON THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW xii-xiv (6 Social and Economic Laws of
Japan series 1963).
12 8 P-H FED. TAX. ExcisE TAX, 190821 (1964) ; 7 CCH STAND. FED. TAX 8520
(1964). H. Res. 8000, effective Sept. 2, 1964. P.L. 88-563.
13 Christensen, Japanese Equity Financing, 38 WASH. L. REv. 105 (1963),
"I OECD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 51.
15 KATAYAMA & NISHIGAKI, INVESTMENT IN JAPAN 6 (1964).
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CHART I
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN JAPAN (1950-FEB. 1964)
I. Technological Assistance and Licensing
II. Securities and Loans
1. Common Stocks
2. Beneficiary Certificates
3. Corporate Debenture
4. Loans
5. Foreign Currency Bonds
2545 cases (almost
two-thirds from U.S.)
$ 633,127,000
4,634,000
530,000
2,067,976,000*
437,125,000
$3,143,392,000
*About half of these loans were from the World Bank (IBRD) and the
U.S. Export-Import Bank.
It is significant to note, however, that stock acquisitions involv-
ing management participation (i.e., direct investment, mostly joint
ventures) only amounted to less than 20% ($196,644,000) of the
$1,070,000,000 in corporate securities. The non-validated (yen base
to July 1, 1963) and validated (as of March 1, 1964) direct investments
are compared below.
CHART II
FOREIGN JOINT VENTURES AND BRANCHES
Types of Enterprises
1. Validated"
Foreign Majority
Foreign/Japanese 50-50
Foreign Minority
(1950-1963)
No. of Enterprises
2. Non-validated"7
Subsidiaries
Branches
16Id. at 20. See also TSfiSHA5GY6sH6 xiGyoK6 u (Enterprise Bureau,
MITI), WAGAxuNi NO G6BEN GAISHA, NO JITrAI (Survey of joint venture companies
in our country) 36 (1964).
17TR 4 E BULLETIN CORP. (Tokyo), THr AP.I 1964 SUPPLnEMNT TO FOREIGN
INVESTMENT, FOREIGN EXcHANGE CONTROL AND IMPORT CONTROL SYSTEM (Book II) 31
(26 Social and Economic Laws of Japan series 1964).
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After the yen base investments were shut off by decree on July 1,
1963, the Ministry of Finance made an investigation and found that
including both subsidiaries and branches the total investment was only
about $140,000,000 (book value) with an estimated annual income
after taxes of about $13,000,000 and $40,000,000 in accumulated in-
come. Not counting the past year, this figure ($140,000,000) is about
the same as the total for validated direct investments since 1950.
The figures thus show the heavy emphasis in Japanese policy on
loans, technological tie-ups, and portfolio securities as opposed to
direct investments. It also shows the strong interest of foreign investors
in the latter since 1959. However, in 1963 the validated, direct invest-
ment, including capital increases in existing enterprises, increased
markedly (1963: 547; 1962: 328), and portfolio investments, which
had been growing significantly each year, leveled off (1963: 95 mil-
lion; 1962: 95 million; 1961: 60 million; 1960: 25 million) as a
result of the U.S. Interest Equalization Tax.
The rapid changes which have taken place in the past year, during
which the articles in this symposium were in preparation, have required
us to select topics related to the underlying institutions of abiding
interest to foreign investors, leaving for another time a fuller treat-
ment of the current regulatory changes and their effect on foreign
investment.18 Particularly, basic to all foreign projects in Japan is the
need for competent legal counsel, and Professors Ohira and Stevens
have pursued their prior interests 9 in this regard to explore and com-
pare the Japanese and U.S. treatment of alien lawyers. Michiko Ariga
and Professor L. Rieke have summarized the history and current
posture of Japanese antimonopoly law, and its influence on business
organization and commercial practices, a topic of general interest to
all enterprises on the threshold of a Japanese investment.
The next article deals with contract and corporate problems raised
by the foreigners' minority position in Japanese joint ventures. Pro-
fessor Mizushima, Mr. Sekiguchi, and Howard Lund, Esquire, have
investigated the investment trust in Japan and indicated its importance
in the public's participation in the Japanese stock market. They have
at the same time, underscored some important problems raised by
18 The writer is preparing a country study on Foreign Investment in Japan for the
American Society of International Law, which will be completed toward the end of
1964.
19 Ohira & Stevens, Admission to the Bar, Disbarment and Disqualification of Law-
yers in Japan and the United States-A Comparative Study, 38 WASH. L. REv. 22
(1963).
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Japanese practices. The central position of foreign technology in Japa-
nese industrial rehabilitation and its importance to the foreigners'
role in direct investments are as conspicuous as the lack of English
language literature on the subject. Messrs. B. Takino and W. French
have dealt with one aspect of the problem; namely, the employee's
rights to his inventions made during employment.
Security transactions are important to the financing and sales opera-
tion of direct investors as well as lending institutions, and Professors
Sono and Shattuck have done a comparative survey of the Japanese
legal devices and practices in this important field.
It is also noteworthy that in the postwar period there had been no
book-length studies on contemporary Japanese law until this past year
when besides our prior Symposium on U.S.-Japanese Business Trans-
actions in 38 Wash. L. Rev. 1-248, three books appeared on Japanese
law: (1) Law in Japan (von Mehren ed. 1963); (2) Maki, Court and
Constitution in Japan (1964); and (3) Ehrenzweig, Ikehara and Jen-
sen, American-Japanese Private International Law (1964). The editors
have asked Harold Wren, Alfred Oppler, and David Stern, respectively,
to review these new works.
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